Abstmct-A high assurance architecture is described for the protection of distributed multilevel secure computing environments from malicious code and other attacks. Com ponent security services and mechanisms extend and inter operate with commodity PCs, commodity client software, applications, trusted components, and legacy single level networks, providing new capabilities for composing secure, distributed multilevel security.
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing need to support mandatory enforce ment of confidentiality and integrity policies in hostile envi ronments. Applicable environments include: military coali tions, responses to security emergencies at home, and busi ness and financial relationships. Neither military computer systems and networks nor their commercial sector equiv alents, are currently organized to provide high assurance support for multilevel security policy enforcement and ad equate defense against increasingly sophisticated attacks.
Thus we risk corruption of critical data and systems, leak age of sensitive information, and degradation of service to fundamental infrastructure systems. Industrial systems run the risk of economic espionage, while the lack of pol icy support for Joint Command and Control Systems con strains military operations. As shown in Table I , attacks against modern systems range from trivial to grave. To secure mission critical information systems, new trusted computing approaches are required, involving both inter operable system security features and standardized secu rity mechanisms. We describe an innovative high assur ance architecture to provide trusted security services and integrated operating system mechanisms that can protect distributed multilevel secure computing environments from malicious code and other attacks. These security services and mechanisms extend and interoperate with existing ap plications and commodity clients, providing new capabil-C.E. Irvine 0-7803-8572-1104/$20.00 ©2004 IEEE ities for composing secure distributed systems using com mercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. The latter ob jective results from the realization that unless a secure system offers users the same comfortable and familiar in terfaces used for handling routine information, it will fail due to lack of acceptability. The Monterey Security Ar chitecture (MYSEA) provides a trusted distributed oper ating environment for enforcing multilevel security poli cies, and utilization of support for incorporation of un modified commodity productivity applications for user ac tivities . It encompasses many low-assurance commercial components and relatively few specialized high-assurance elements. This arrangement permits the ongoing invest ment in commodity personal computer (PC) operating sys tems and applications to be integrated into an environment where enforcement of critical security policies is assigned to more trusted elements. Assurance is derived from the ap plication of high assurance system design and development methods to the trusted elements as well as to the overall architecture.
The locus of policy enforcement in MYSEA is a high assurance platform, currently the DigitalNet XTS-400. We have vertically integrated application security requirements with underlying security services, and can apply an existing Quality of Security Service model and framework [1J to the integrated security structure. Additionally, MYSEA supports secure trusted path communications between the user and the trusted as, as well as high assurance labeling for incoming traffic from legacy single level networks.
The state of the art for protecting multilevel informa tion and for the management of security policies and secu rity services in support of critical applications is advanced through several innovations:
• A distributed architecture for isolating trusted compo nents in support of commercial and open source applica tions. The innovative use of add-on trusted components in commercial client-server systems can potentially magnify the impact of highly trusted systems.
• A trusted path mechanism for assured, unambiguous user communication with the trusted computing base, which does not depend upon client workstation security.
• Techniques for vertical integration of security policy con trol functions with underlying security services in a Quality of Security Service framework. Using the Trusted Path Extension at the PC allows users to log on to the MYSEA system by way of a trusted path. This establishes an identity for audit and access control purposes, and then establishes session security attributes such as current session level. Subsequently, the user can log on to the native client as at the PC and use (1) standard commercial client software (e.g., web browser or e-mail program) to access applications supported by the MYSEA Server or by servers on a connected single level existing network, or (2) use any applications on the local PC. From the PC the user can access any level of server data allowed by the security policy (for example, reading domains of data that are lower in sensitivity than the nego tiated session level) as well as access locally crea.ted data. By again invoking the trusted path, the user can request to modify session security attributes , such as session level. During such negotiations, the Trusted Path Extension en sures that client access to the network is blocked. 
Web Enlblemenll
Portll Server Mail Hrver functionally equivalent in terms of overall application-level protocol support to a commodity application server for the particular protocol provided. Thus, each application server is compatible with existing commodity client packages. Ad ditionally, information managed by application servers can be organized to support such sharing as allowed by the kernel policy, as well as advisory labeling.
B.2 Server TCB
The foundation for the server TCB (depicted in Figure 2 ) is the DigitalNet STOP security kernel. The STOP kernel creates labeled protection domains and associates security attributes with active and passive entities exported at its interface. The DigitalNet system provides multilevel se cure file system support, which provides for the global and persistent separation of data into its respective domains. Other security services that have been integrated into the trusted system are described below. to accessing files and other objects associated only with the current session level. Starting with a threat model and a system requirements specification (see [15] ), we developed a system architecture.
From these, we derive functional specifications and a cor responding detailed design specification for specific com ponents. Concurrent development of requirements, func tional, and design specification allow generalizable notions to be identified and abstracted for inclusion in the higher level documents. Conversely, detailed items more appro priate for the lower-level specification can be moved down.
All development undergoes analysis and testing.
IV. RELATED WORK
The research defined in this paper builds on a variety of previous efforts. It extends work to construct a multilev el partially, outside of the system security perimeter (unless the entire system is included within that perimeter, thus nullifying any possible assurance arguments). In contrast to the MYSEA architecture trusted path mechanism, the XTS-400 does not support a remote trusted path.
V. CONCLUSION
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) provides a trusted distributed environment for enforCing multilevel security policies, and supports unmodified COTS produc tivity applications. The architecture encompasses a com bination of many (untrusted) commercial components and relatively few trusted multilevel secure elements. MY SEA introduces several innovations for protecting multi level data and for managing security policies and security services in support of critical applications, including:
• A distributed high assurance multilevel architecture that
utilizes commercial and open source applications.
• A trusted path mechanism.
• Techniques for vertical integration of security policy con trol functions with underlying security services.
• Access to existing Single-level networks. be used as early examples of the TCX kernel.
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